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Introduction
In recent decades, progress toward a world economy that is integrated
across national boundaries has been especially dramatic in the liberaliza-
tion of international trade in goods. Economists generally welcome this
development, prescribing free trade as the regime that maximizes global
economic welfare. Economists also recommend liberalized trade as a pol-
icy that is likely to produce gains for each national economy. Economists
recognize that the same theory that applies to goods also applies to inter na-
tional trade in other markets. Nations can gain from not only the free
movement of goods across national boundaries but also the free movement
of labor across national boundaries. 1
The basic intuition for this result derives from the gains from interna-
tional trade in the labor market. VI/e \vo111d expect labor to migrate from
low-wage countries to high-wage countries in pursuit of higher \vages As a
t Earle Hepburn Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School: Visiting
Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School Copyright (£:. 2008 by Howard F.
Chang. ] would like to thank Joseph Carens, Stephen Perry, Joshua Rabinowitz. and
conference participants at Cornell University, at the University of Pennsylvania, at
Sacramento State University, and at the L;niversity of Glouccstershire for helpful
comments.
1. See Howard F. Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Flee Tmde: Ecollomic V/eljare
alld the Optima! Immigration Policy, 145 U PA. 1. RF\' 1147. ]148-50 (19<){l
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rcsult of migration, world output rises. Higher 'vVZlgcS in the host country
imply that I he marginal product of labor is highn there than in the source
country. That is, higher \vagcs fm the same \\'prker mean thelt tite worker
oroduces more value in the host countl'j' than in the source countr\'. Labor
I ,
migration generally leads to net gains in wealth for the world as a whole
because labor flows to the country where it has the higher valuc use.-'- For
this reason, economic theory raises <1 presumption in favor of the free
movement of lahor. Migration restrictions distort the global labor market,
producing a misallocation of lahor among countries, thereby wasting
human resources and creating unnecessary poveny in labor-abundant
cOllntries. The larger the inequality in wages between countries, the larger
the distortion of glohallabor markets caused hy migration restrictions, and
the larger the economic gains from liberalizing labor migration Given the
degree of \vage inequality in the world today, it should be apparent that the
gains from liberalized migration are huge.
Despite the presumption that economic theory raises in favor of inter-
national labor mobility, the nations of the world maimain restrictions on
immigration and show little inclination to liberalize these barriers signifi-
cantly. To some degree, however, globalization proceeds in the labor mar-
ket despite the immigration barriers that states raise. In the United States,
[or example, there are probably more than ten million unauthorized immi-
grants residing among us today, accounting for more than 3°/0 of the total
U.S. population, with 700,000 more unauthorized immigrams arriving
each year on average.> Thus, the global labor market resists attempts by
states to restrict the flow of labor across borders.
Most unauthorized immigrants in the United States come from lvlex-
ico,4 where workers earn one-ninth of the amount that they can earn in the
United States':; Given the disparity in wages between these labor markets
and the tight restrictions on the legal emry of workers, the incentives for
illegal immigration are enormous. Indeed, in recent years, hundreds of
unauthorized immigrants have died attempting to enter the United States
from Mexico under dangerous conditions, and these deaths have given a
sense of urgency to the campaign for liberalized immigration laws. 6
Efforts to liheralize restrictions on the flow of workers into the United
States have picked up momentum recently as President George 'N. Bush
has proposed an expanded guest-worker program that would allow unau-
2. Sec P.-\l'L R. KRl'G~I'\N & lvL\l'RICI' On"TII I I), hlll<'';.-\TIOl'',\1. Eco\:()1\IICS: THEORY
,\NIJ PULICY 162-63 (6th ed. 2003).
3. See jl-F1REY S. P.. \SSEL, PloW HISP,\NIC c: I R., L",\l'TH( )RIZU) MIGRANTS: NUt\IlJERS .-\,,1)
CH,\It\CTERISTICS 3, 6 (2005), avai/eI!J!e ac http//pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php7
ReportID=46 The total population of the United States reached 300 million in October
2006. Sec Sam Roberts, A 300 iVlilliolltil ;\lllel;((/lI, N.Y TI~ILs, Oct. 18, 2006, at A 15.
'-t. P,bSl!, supm note 3, at '-t.
5. Sec lvfcx;wll Deportees Report Good TrfCltlllflH, LPl, .'\pr. 2L, 1996, available at
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (reporting that l'vlexican immigrants received an average
of $278 per week in the United States, compared with the equivalent of $3081 per week
in Mexico).
6. See, [.<~., Sellate COllllllittee COllducts HCClrillg 011 Illlllligratioll Reform Legis/eltioll,
82 INTIRI'I~rTlR RIII:"\SIS ] 243, 1244 (2005) (comments or Sen. John McCain).
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thorized ilTlmigrams to legalize their status as guest workers.? The Senate
passed a bill in 2006 that would establish such a guesHvorker program
and also expand opportunities for legal immigration and permanent resi-
deI1Ce, gathering broad bipartisan supportS Although the Republican
majority in the House of Representatives failed to support the Senate bill,
the November 2006 elections, which shifted control of the House to the
Democrats, improved the prospects for liberalized immigration lavvs in the
near future."!
In this article, I argue that considerations of not only economic effi-
ciency but also distributive justice militate in favor of liberalized immigra-
tion laws in countries like the United States. First, in Part I, I review the
economic theory and empirical evidence regarding the impact of interna-
tionallabor migration. lo This literature indicates that even partialhberali-
zation of international migration would produce substantial increases in
the \vorld's real income and improve its distribution by reducing interna-
tional inequality. This literature also suggests that immigration has had
only a small adverse effect on the distribution of income among natives in
the United States. Furthermore, economic theory suggests that the most
efficient response to concerns about the distribution of income among
natives is to increase the progressivity of our tax system, rather than to
restrict immigration. Restrictive immigration policies are not only likely to
be relatively costly as an instrument for redistribution among natives but
also perverse from the standpoint of global distributive justice. In Pan n, I
turn to the ethical question of whether countries of immigration have a
moral duty to reduce global economic inequality. I argue that the liberal
ideals espoused by countries like the United States require a global view of
distributive justice, and I respond to some of the alternative conceptions
advanced by critics of this cosmopolitan perspective. Finally, in Part Ill, I
conclude with normative implications for immigration reforms in liberal
states.
1. The Economic Effects of International Labor Migration
A survey of recent estimates of the economic impacts of international
labor migration indicates that liberalization of this migration would pro-
duce substantial increases in the world's real income and improve its distri-
bution. Moreover, estimates of the impact of immigration on native
workers in the United States indicate that only the least skilled native \\'ork-
7. Sec, eg., Pres Bush RCllcws CallIor (/ TelJJporary \\'0,-/1(,,- ProgralJJ. 82 J:-,TII{I'I<I TieR
RIII·.\",1 S 274 (2005): Presidellt Rlish AIlIlOlU1C..S IIl1llli,~laliol1 Jllil;alivc 81 1,<11 RI"RI III{
(\.111,·\:-.1" 33 (2004).
8. See SCIl<lle Passes JIJlIJJ;,~f(l/iOIl Bill, COIl/iTOICC Ne ..d..d 10 Resolve S.. lloiC alld I/OIIV
DifliTcl1ces, 83 hTLI{I"WITI{ R;II.\~I", 1037 (2000)
. 9. See R:mdal C. Archihnld. J)cl1Jocmtic \'iClor\' ~a;scs Spirils ofT/lOse Fa\'orill,~ Citi-
:.ellship for Illegal A!il'm, 1\iY TI~ll ". '\n\'. 10, 2006, at A27
10. For a IlltllT cOl11prchcnsi\'c surveyor this literature. sec 1100\',nd F. Chang. The
bel/ill/iiic illlPOCI of JIl(CrIWli,)/1al Loho,- Ivli,l',lut;OIl' J~CCe'lll ES1;IJI(/(CS olld Polin !lIlp!iUl-
i lOllS, I () TI\II' ,\ 'I &: CI\ !I IS. L. RI\ 321 (200/).
-+ COli/eli Il1lCllwliol1al LCllv.loUillcd \/01. of!
crs suffer adverse effects and that these effects <1re small. Although immi-
gration restrictiolls may prevcl1l these adverse cflects. these rcstricti(lns are
~Oi. only likely to be costly as a response to concerns abom Income distri-
bution among natives but also perverse from the standpoint of global c.iis-
Lribmive justice.
A. Distribution of the Gains from International Migration
Some economists have attempted to estimate the gains that the world
could enjoy by liberalizing migration. for example, in an early study using
clata from 1977, Bob Hamilton and John 'vVhalley produced a range of esti-
mates based on various assumptions about critical parameters, but all of
their estimates suggest that the potential gains are enormous. I I Many of
their estimates indicate that the elimination of immigration restrictions
could more than double the world's real income, and even their most con-
servative estimate indicates that the world's real income would rise by
13%.12 They also find that liberalized migration 'would reduce global ine-
quality by raising wages dramatically for the world's poorest workers. 1 3
In a recent study applying the same assumptions to 1998 c1ata,
Jonathon Moses and Bjorn Letnes produced similar results, finding that
"the estimated efficiency gains from liberalizing immigration controls have
only increased over time" as a result of the increase in "wage ... inequali-
ties over the past 20 years." 1-+ Even when they adopt more conservative
assumptions, "the estimated gains remain substantial," ranging from 5.6%
to 12.3% of the world's real income, or from $1.97 trillion to $433 trillion
per year. 15 Given that even their most conservative estimates "exceed the
combined current levels of development assistance and foreign direct
investment to the developing world," they suggest that "international
migration may be one of the most effective means of shrinking the i.ncome
gap that separates rich and poor countries."16 Furthermore, their esti-
mates of the benefits of partial liberalization of migration controls indicate
that "a substantial portion of these gains can be reaped without allovving
for full migration," because evp.n small increases in migration "could pro-
duce significant economic gains," large enough to "dwarf those generated
by traditional development policies." 1 7
The World Bank has recently studied the potential gains from such a
11 See Bob Hamilton & John Whalley, EfJiciency and Distributional Implications oj
Global Restrictions on Labour Mobility, 14]. DEV. Eco! . 61 (1984).
12. See id. at 70- 72.
13. See id at 73-74.
14. Jonathon W. Moses & Bj0rn Letnes, The Economic Costs 10 International Lahor
Restrictions: Revisiting the Empirical Discussion, 32 WORLD DEV. 1609, 1610, 1619
(2004).
15. Id. at 1616. The estimated gains in what they consider "the most reasonable.
scenario" are 53.39 trillion per year, or 9.6% of the world's real income. Id. at1615-l6
16 Id. at 1620.
17. ld. at 1610; see id. at 1616-18.
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limited increase in international migration. 18 The World Bank economists
consider the effects of an increase in migration from "developing" coun-
tries to "high-income countries" sufficient to increase the labor force in the
host countries by 3% by the year 202519 They conclude that this scenario
"would generate large increases in global welfare,"2o increasing the world's
real income by 0.6%, that is, by $356 billion in 2025 21
V"ould the effects of immigrant workers in the labor market, however,
be in the economic interest of natives in the countries of immigration? If
we examine the impact of immigrants in the labor market, we find that the
natives of a host country, taken together, will gain [rom the immigration o[
labor. 22 \Vages may fall for those native workers who compete with immi-
grant lahor, but this loss [or those workers is a pure transfer among natives:
it is offset by an equal gain for those who employ labor and ultimately for
consumers, \-\'ho obtain goods and services at lower cost. 23 Furthermore,
natives gain from employing immigrant workers: they gain surplus in
excess of what they pay immigrants for their labor24 Thus, natives as a
group enjoy a net gain [rom employing immigrants25 1n [act, the World
Bank economists estimate that the high-income countries receiving immi-
grants in their liberalization scenario would enjoy an increase o[ 0.4% in
their real income, that is, a gain of $139 billion26
In addition, immigrants also gain from their own migration. They
obtain higher wages than in their source countries and thereby enjoy far
larger gains per capita than natives in host countries do from their immi-
gration. In the scenario analyzed by the World Bank, the additional
migrants allovved to move under liberalized immigration policies nearly
triple their own real income on average, enjoying a gain of $162 billion,
even after subtracting remittances sent back to those left behind in their
countries of origin27 In this sense, labor migration represents a form of
international trade in which the source country exports labor to the host
couiltry21'-: Like international trade in goods, labor migration allows for-
eign suppliers to sell their services to domestic buyers, allowing both par-
ties in each transaction to gain from trade. 29
18. Sec \\\)I<I.D B,\Nh, GLOBAL ECO~OMIC PRO<,PFCTS 2006: ECllNll'\IIC hlPI IC/\TI()~C, ()I
RrJ\IITT.-\"C1:S Ai'OD MIGlv-\TION (2006).
19. ld at 25.
20. ld. al 26
21. See id at 31.
22. Set' \;AfI°"il\ I RI:SEARCH COU"iCIL, THE lEW AMERICAt"S: [UJ:--.iO,\.IIC, DI.\!OGR/\I'HIC,
..\1'f) FISc.\1. EIIECTS OF !"!'\.1I(;Rt\TIO" 135-53 Uames P Smith & Barry Edmonston cds..
1997).
23. See iel at 138-39
24. See id. at 139 (stating that immigrants are paid less than the value or the new
goods and sen'ices that they help produce).
25 Sec id
26. Sec \\'nRI l) B..\:-;K, supra note 18, at 34.
27 Sec iel. (predicting that the migrants would increase their real incomE' !w 199°io).
28 Sec T\'ATI()l"i\! RrSi'.·\RCH Cm';-';C1I, supra notc 22, al 146 (comparing immigration
10 international trade in producls)
29 St'c iel (concluding that tlw reasons explaining the net national gain from trading
\vith other countries also explain Ihe ne[ national gain from immigration).
6 CJlIlt'/! Itltcrllatiullcl! Lan Jourllal \'0 I. -f I
In theory, migration may make those left hehind in the source coun-
tries worse off insofar as they no longer enjoy the gains from trade that
they enjoyed from employing the workers who have emigrated. vVorkers
left behind may enjoy an increase in \vages as a result of the departure of
competing workers. but employers and their consumers would lose more
from the departure of those emigrants than the workers left behind would
gain from their departure. 3o As long as the migrants allowed to move
under the liberalization analyzed by the World Bank send the same propor-
tion of their incolne to those left behind in source countries as that sent by
existing migrants, however, the World Bank estimates that with these remit-
tances, those left behind would enjoy a net increase of 0.9% in their real
income, that is, a gain of $143 billion3l Developing countries, including
the migrants allowed to move in this scenario, enjoy an increase of 1.8% in
their real income. 32 Thus, "the relative gains are much higher for develop-
ing-country households than high-income country households," not only
increasing the world's real income, but also reducing international income
inequality33
An understanding of the economic effects of international labor
migration gives us some reasons to question the claims of Thomas Pogge,
who argues that "those who accept a weighty moral responsibility toward
needy foreigners should devote their time, energy, and resources not to the
struggle to get more of them admitted into the rich countries, but rather to
the struggle to institute an effective programme of global poverty eradica-
tion," which would transfer resources from rich countries to programs to
help the global poor. H Although he agrees that "richer states ought to
admit more needy persons," he explains that "we should expend our scarce
political energy and resources" on "other moral projects with regard to
which our mobilizing efforts can be much more effective. "35 Our review of
the economics of labor migration, however, casts some doubt on the empir-
ical claims on which Pogge relies.
First, Pogge notes that the "number of desperate foreigners" that richer
states "might conceivably come to admit ... are ridiculously small in com-
parison to the number of those who are in desperate need."36 This obser-
vation would suggest that liberalized immigration would be relatively
ineffective in reducing global poverty, but only if we assume that only
those who migrate would benefit from liberalization. Labor migration con-
fers important benefits on the poor who remain in source countries, how-
ever, not only through remittances but also hy increasing the wages of
workers left behind. Given this wealth transfer to poor workers and away
from their employers in developing countries, migration would not only
30. See WORLD B,\, 1<, supra note 18, at 57 -58.
31. See id. at 34.
32. See ie!. at 31
33. fd. at 35.
34. Thomas Pogge, Migmtion and Poverty, in CITIZENSHIP ANn E:-;CllISll)N 12, 14 (Veit
Bader ed, 1997).
35. ld. at 12.
36. ld. at 13.
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increase incomes for migrants but also tend to reduce income inequality in
poor countries.
Second, Pogge argues that transfers of wealth from rich countries to
programs for the global poor would be more feasible politically than liber-
alized immigration policies. 37 The economics of labor migration, however,
indicate that liberalized immigration policies would confer net gains not
only on the migrants and their source countries but also on natives in host
countries. These gains from trade suggest a reason to favor migration over
transfer policies on the merits: whereas labor migration is a positive-sum
game for the world as a whole, transfers are at best a zero-sum game. Fur-
thermore, these gains for natives of host countries suggest some reason to
believe that liberalized admissions are more likely to prove politically feasi-
ble than the transfer policies that would produce the same benefit for the
global poor, despite Pogge's claims to the contrary. After all, whereas trans-
fer policies would impose costs on rich countries, liberalized admissions
for workers from poor countries would confer net economic benefits on
natives of host countries.,8
B. Distribution Among Natives in the United States
Despite the significant gains from international trade in the labor mar-
ket, countries often restrict immigration to protect native vvorkers from the
unemployment or the wage reductions that the entry of foreign workers
\",ould supposedly entail. In this sense, immigration barriers, like trade
barriers, are protectionist: they are designed to protect natives from foreign
competition. 39 Protection ists often defend these barriers as policies tha t
promote a more equal distribution of income among natives, pointing to
the adverse effects of immigration on the welfare of the least skilled work-
ers in particular. Contrary to popular belief, however, these concerns for
distributive justice do not provide a sound justification for our restrictive
immigration laws.
First, as I have noted elsewhere:
[C]oncerns regarding income inequality do not justify any restrictions on
skilled immigration, because skilled immigrants not only increase (otal
wealth for natives but also promote a more equitable distribution of income
among natives They are likely to have an adverse effect only on competing
skilled natives and increase the real wages of everyone else, including less
37. Sec iii at 16-22. Poggc proposes raising funds for the glohal pnor from"general
tax revenues" in "rich countries" or from other sources that would place a fiscal burden
on lhe global rich lei allY; .~(( id at 19-21
3H. TIl the extent that Poggc relics on "the hostility and anger" that popr immigrants
"gennate among our com pat rims" to support his claims, icl at 22. he may be unduly
pessimisric about our ahility to llVelTome such intolerance I\S I have argued elsewhere.
these xenophohic or racist allitudt's ma)' he "more amenable to rdorm than the ten-
denc)' of natives to pursue their own self-interest." Hnward F. Chang. Inllnigruliol1 dnd
tllc \\()JlIp/acc: Immi,t;ultio!1 Rest riC/lOllS us employment Discrilllilldtion. 78 CHI.-KI'''] I..
RI·\. 2LJ I. 320 (2003). 'The evolution of attitudes in the L'nitcd SLues tnward ('lImic
gwups once grectcd with Iwstility offers hl11x that morc lnler<lIlt <llll111dcs \\'ill evenlu-
ally prT\'ail with respect to those \\'Illl currently dominate the immigrant fll1\\·.·· lei
39 Sec Chang, slIprd nOll' 38. at 308.
COll1e/l IIlLUliUliuilU! Luw jOUJl1u!
skilled natives. who enjoy the henefit5 01 a greater supply or skilled lahul'.
Thereforc. the pursuit of a more equal distribution 01 income would al mosl
justify concerns regarding unskilled immigration. which cuuld have an
<!ch"ersc eff"ecr on the real \-V'ages 01 unskilled native \vorl,crs:w
Second, studies of the effects of immigration in US labor markets
have shown little evidence of any significant effects on native \".'ages or
employment, even for the least skilled native workers. 4 I Given the small
effects of immigration on native wages and employment, protectionist poli-
cies seem particularly misguided David Card's influential study of the
effect of the Mariel Cubans on the Miami labor market, for example, pro-
duces fairly typical results for this literature: he found that the arrival of
125,000 Cubans in 1980, which increased the supply of labor in Miami by
7% almost overnight, had virtually no effect on the wages and employment
opportunities for workers in Miami, including unskilled whites and
unskilled blacks. 42
Immigrants have had little adverse impact on the wages and employ-
ment of natives in part because "the demand for labor does not remain
fixed when immigrants enter the economy,""'!) as I have explained else-
where: "Immigrant workers not only supply labor, for example, they also
demand goods and services, and this demand will translate into greater
demand for locally supplied labor."H An influx of labor will also create a
profit opportunity for investors, which in turn will attract capital to the
economic activities employing the immigrant laboL This expansion in the
sector of the economy employing this labor will also increase the demand
for that labor, which in turn would tend to offset the effect of increased
supply.4'5
Furthermore, the empirical evidence indicates that immigrants and
natives are not perfect substitutes in the labor market, so they often do not
compete for the same jobs. 46 In fact, labor markets are highly segregated,
with immigrant labor concentrated in some occupations while natives are
-to. Id.
-t I. Sec George J. Borjas, The [COIlO/YI ics oj 1111111 igratioll, 32 j. ECON. LITl,RA rUIU, 16fi7,
l697 -98 (1994) (concluding that empirical estimates suggest that the effect of immigra-
tion on the labor market outcomes of natives is small); Rachel M. Friedberg & Jennifer
Hunt, The ImpC/ct of IlIlmigmllts 011 Hosl COUllt ry WC/ges, Employment alld Growth, J. fcu".
PIRSI' , Spring 1995, at 23, 42 (same).
-+2 Sec David Card, The ImpC/o oj the Muriel Boat/iJt Oil the Miami LC/bor t'vlar/cet, 43
hl)l's & L.\B. RII. RE\. 245, 256 (1990)
-+ 3. Chang, supra note 38, at 306
H. Id.
45 Thus, hy shifting resources to the sectors of the economy employing immigrants,
an economy can mitigate or even eliminate the adverse effects that immigrant workers
may have on the wages of competing native workers. See Noel Gaston & Douglas f\:el-
son, Immigmtioll C/Ild Labour-Marllet Outcomes ill the United States: A Political-EcoIlOIII)'
Puzzle, 16 O:-;IC'RD REV. ECON. POi'y 104, 108 (2000) (noting that "some of the adjust-
ment ... v.;ill occur via a change in the output mix, reducing the ... costs to the compet-
ing factor (i.e. domestic unskilled labourr)·
46 See gellemily Jean Baldwin Grossman, The Substitutability oj Natives and I111111 i-
gmnts ill Production, 64 REV. ECUN. & STAT. 596 (1982).
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concentrated in others.47 Immigrants compete with one another far more
than they compete with natives. 4R Indeed, some immigrant labor can be a
complement rather than a substitute for some native labor, so that an
increase in the supply of immigrant labor will increase the demand for
native labor and thus have positive effects on native wages rather than neg-
a tive effects.
Nevertheless, some economists claim that immigration has had a sig-
nificant adverse impact on the least skilled native workers. 49 It is impor-
tant, however, to interpret these claims cardully in light of the positive
effects of immigration on the demand for native labor. Recent \vork by
Borjas, in particular, is often cited by restrictionists for his large estimates
of the effect of immigrants on native wages. In a study published in 2003,
he attempts to estimate the effect of all immigration between 1980 and
2000 on native workers in the United States, concluding that the large
influx of workers over these two decades reduced the \vage of the average
native worker by 3.2°1c) and the wage of high-school dropouts by 8.9% dur-
ing this period. 50 These results, however, are based on a simulation that
makes two extreme assumptions. First, he assumes that immigrants are
perfect substitutes for natives within each class of labor. Second, he
assumes that the capital stock is fixed and does not respond to this immi-
gration by increasing the supply of capital to the economic activities
employing this expanded supply of labor, thereby increasing the demand
for the labor in question. 51 Given these unrealistic assumptions, his simu-
lation is inherently biased in favor of finding large adverse effects on native
workers .
.A more recent study by Gianmarco Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri uses a
simulation that instead allows the supply of capital to adjust and allo\vs
immigrants and natives within each class of labor to be imperfect substi-
tutes.s2 By relaxing the unrealistic assumptions used by Borjas in his
study, Ottaviano and Peri produce dramatically different results. Once
they allow the capital stock to adjust fully, they estimate that all immigra-
tion into the United States from 1990 to 2004 increased the average wage of
native workers by 1.8% and decreased the wage of native high-school clrop-
47. SCI:' NXI!n"'_\1 RE'+\RCH Cl'lINCII, SlIplCl note 22, at 218 (concluding that the data
suggest thai "the johs of immigrant and nati\"e wurkers are differen!').
''is Thus, immigration does haw a Illore substantial adverse effect on the \\·ages n!
Dther immigrants. who are much closer substitutes for flew il11l11lgrants. Sec id at 223
("The one group that appears to suffer significant negative effects from new immigrants
are earlier waves of immigrants, according to many studies.·').
49. Sce, '"-,1;_, GI,ll~CF j. B()I~J;\''', HI ..\\-I"·~ l)')"l!: hl',J1(,j~.·\li')" 1\)11(\ ·\i':IJ II1I ;\\1! 1'1
, .. \" h"N,)\lY 99 (1999) (claiming lhat immigratiofl "transfers a substantial amount ,)(
\vealth away from the workers who compete wlth immigrants to the natives wh,) haH'
skills n! physical resources that henefn Ir"111 the presence of immigrallts"' and that ··il is
the less-skilled ll,l(lves who pay the price of Illlmigratioll··).
50 George J Borps, The Lah(1I" DCl!wnd CUlVe Is D01\IJ1\'Uld Slopil1:-!,_ 1<. .... \aI1I1IJill:,; ,I/("
II11fJaCl o{ II1J11ligmliof) 011 Ille Labol M(//II .. I, 118 Q I [( \)".1335. 1368 (2003)
') I lei C"lajssul1llng thai the capital stock is cOflstallt·')
'52 Sec Cianmarcn 11'. ()tl;wWllO l\r (;!(1\-;l!l!li IJeri. !-I.cthil1lwl,'-!, the Iffeels 01 iIJliJlI,\;lii-
11011 Oil Wilges )-4 (~,Jt'! Bureau of Econ. Rc",·arch. \\orking Paper ~o 12497,20i\()
10 Cornell I/lltll!(uio/lu/ I.u\\· jOU/'/Iii! \(J/ -+ 1
outs hy only 1.1(/0.) l Indeed, they find thaI all nati\"t' workers \vith at least
a high school education enjoy increased wages as a result of this immigra-
tion rather than reduced wages. 5-+ Thus, this influx of immigrants had an
adverse effect only on the shrinking minority of native workers with less
than a high school education,55 and this effect was quite small.
C. Protectionism and Distributive Justice
'liVe may want to prevent even relatively small reductions in the wages
of our least skilled workers, and protectionists may defend immigration
restrictions on this basis. Like trade barriers, hO\vever, immigration barri-
ers sacrifice gains from trade and thus reduce the total wealth of natives as
a group. In this sense, protectionism is a costly way to redistribute wealth
from some natives to others. 56 We could redistribute the same wealth
through tax policies and transfer programs rather than through protection-
ism and probably would thereby make all classes of natives hetter off than
they are under restrictive immigration policies, because immigration pro-
duces net gains for natives as a group.57
If we wish to protect unskilled native workers from adverse changes in
the distribution of income, then progressive reforms of tax and transfer
policies are likely to prove less costly than protectionist immigration
restrictions. As long as immigration increases total wealth, those who gain
from immigration can compensate those who lose and still be better of[58
Redistribution can shift the costs of liberalized immigration policies to the
beneficiaries of liberalization. Protectionist policies currently impose an
impliCit tax on natives that probably costs them more than the explicit tax
that would be necessary to compensate unskilled native workers for the
effects of liberalized immigration policies. 59 Once we recognize that pro-
tectionism is merely a disguised tax-and-transfer program, it should be
apparent that there is no good reason to favor protectionism over less costly
and more efficient transfer policies.
We could probably achieve redistribution more effiCiently and equita-
bly by expanding programs already in place in our tax system. Given the
small adverse effects of immigration and the small number of native work-
ers who find their wages reduced by the influx of immigrant labor, a fairly
small increase in the progressivity of our tax rates would suffice to com-
pensate the few who lose income as a result of competition from immigrant
'53. Sec iii at 4.
54. Sec id.
55. Sec BORJAS, supra note -+9, at 27 (noting that '"by 1998, only <) percent of natives
lacked a high school diploma" and showing how this percentage declined steadily over
the preceding four decades); "'!.\TIU AI. RESEARCH COUNCIl., supra note 22, at 228 (noting
that a[b]y 1995, high school dropouts represented less than 10 percent of the American
workforce" and were '"a declining group of American workers").
56. See Chang, supra note 38, at 308
57. See id. at 309-1t.
58. See id at 309.
59. See id.
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workers. 60 We could make Social Security taxes more progressive, for
example, or we could increase the earned income tax credit and liberalize
its requirements.
Furthermore, this discussion of distributive justice among natives has
ignored the benefits that the immigrants themselves enjoy from their access
to our labor markets and the benefits that flow to people overseas in the
form of remittances. This discussion has assumed that the welfare of
immigrants and people overseas is of no concern to us. Once we give some
v/eight to the interests of those born outside our borders, however, we have
yet another reason to liberalize immigration. Once we recognize any moral
obligation to reduce poverty abroad and to reduce global inequality, we
must confront the significant economic harm \ve inflict on those we
exclude under our restrictive immigration la\vs. Given the adverse effects
of restrictive immigration policies on the poor abroad, considerations of
global justice militate in favor of progressive fiscal poliCies and against pro-
tectionism as a method of addressing any concerns regarding the distribu-
tion of income among natives.
II. Liberal Ideals and Global Distributive Justice
Immigration restrictions keep disadvantaged groups of people in con-
ditions of poverty and deprive them of equal access to important economic
opportunities. In this sense, as I have argued elsewhere, immigration
restrictions are much like laws mandating employment discrimination or
residential segregation in the domestic context 61 When it comes to racial
segregation in the domestic context, we condenm segregation for keeping
disadvantaged groups in an underclass, cut of[ from valuable social and
economic opportunities. For example, our couns refuse to enforce zoning
ordinances or racially restrictive covenants that exclude blacks from \vhite
neighborhoods62 \Ve would not consider such laws or covenants any
more acceptable if they excluded aliens rather than racial minorities from
local communities63 If we would reject such exclusionary practices as vio-
60. Sa icl. at 310-11
61. Sec, e.g., I Joward F. Chang, CllltLlral Co 111 111 unities ill a Clohal Labor Marl1ct: Immi-
gration Restrictiolls as Residential Segregation, 2007 u. CIII Ll:c/\1 F 93 (2007); Chang,
supra note 38.
62. Sec Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. ] (] 948) (holding that the Fourleenth Amend-
ment prohibits states from enforCing racially restrictive covenants): Buchanan v. \Varlcy.
245 U.S 60 (1917) (holding that the FOUrleenth Amendment prohibits lav,ls that forbid
blacks to reside in while neighborhoods).
63. See Graham \' Richardson, 403 US 365,372 (197 I) (declaring that "classifica-
tiolls based on alienage, like those based 011 race, arc inhcrE'lltly suspect"). The
author tJf the Gru]lill11 opinion would later explain that "aliens often have been the \'ie-
lim5 of irrational discrimination" and "historically have been disabled by Ilw prejudice
of the maJority'-' which "led the Court te) conclude that alienage classifications 'Ill them-
selves supply a reasnn to infer anlipathy' ... and therefore demand dose judicial scru-
tiny." Toll v. '10reno. -+58 l.'S I, 20~21 (Blackmun, J, concurring) (yuoling Personnel
Adm'r v. Feeney, ++2 US 256.272 (1979)) The Gra)JUI11 LWUrt "lruel, dO\vn stall' law5
conditioning aecec,s 1.0 wclfare benefits on either L'.S. eitl;:cnshlp or rcsidence in lhe
lniled SlillCS fnr ,I 5pceified numher ell' years Sec GI'll)WllI. -t03 U.S. 365 Rccogni=l!lg
l2 (oii/eil llllCllltuiOi/cil Lelw jOUJlwl
lations or liberal principles of equality, then \\hy should exclusion be any
more legitimate when the exclusion occurs on a national scale rather than
at the local levet:' \Vhy should it be less troubling to exclude an alien from
an entire country rather than from a single neighborhood! Expanding the
geographic scope of the community from \vhich we exclude the alien only
broadens the range of opportunities that we thereby deny that alien64
One might object to the analogy that I draw between immigration
restrictions and segregation in the domestic context by challenging my pre-
mise that aliens are as entitled to distributive justice under our laws as
natives. In particular, one might claim that we do not owe the same con-
cern to prospective immigrants as we do to incumbent residents. In com-
paring immigration restrictions to de jure segregation in the domestic
context, I have relied on the premise that prospective immigrants as well as
natives are entitled to equal concern65 I suggest here that the liberal ideals
expressed in our declaration that "all men are created equal"66 require
such a cosmopolitan perspective.
Consider the notion of equal concern expressed in the liberal theory
of justice developed by John Rawls, who asks what principles individuals
would choose behind a "veil of ignorance."(>7 In this "original position,"
individuals know nothing about their own personal circumstances or
traits; thus, "they do not know how the various alternatives will affect their
own partkular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on
the basis of general considerations. "68 This position ensures that the par-
ties are "fairly situated and treated equally as moral persons."(19 Rawls,
however, includes only persons within a Single "society," which he
describes as "a cooperative venture for mutual advantage," as participants
in the original position 7o That is, he assumes that the "boundaries" of his
principles of justice "are given by the notion of a self-contained national
community."7l
the tension between the Graham reasoning and federal immigration restrictions, how-
ever, the Supreme Court would later refuse to apply the same scrutiny to federal laws
discriminating against aliens. See Mathews v. Diaz, -+26 U.s 67,81-87 (1976)
64 Sec Roger Nell, The Civil Right We An: Not Ready for The Right oj Free Movement
or People Oil the Face oj the Earth, 81 E'fl\lCS 2] 2.224 (1971) ("ivlay we expect the lesson
which the Negro has taught his fellow Americans about denial of fair opportunities to be
repeated on a broader scale, with the underprivileged of the earth demanding 'desegre-
gation' of nation Slates?"'): see also Darrel Moeliendorf, [qluLiity of Opportunity Global-
izecP, I\) C\N JL & JURISPRUDENCE 30] (2006) (defending the principle of global
equality of opportunity). The analogy hetween racial segregation and immigration
restrictions suggests that we should view the campaign for liberalized immigration poli-
cies as a natural eXlension of the civil rights movement. Sec Kevin R. johnson & Bill
Gng Hing, The Immigrallt Rights Marches of 2006 aile! the Prospects for a New Civil Rights
Movemellt, -+2 Ht\i{\,. C.R-C.L. L. Rl:'v. 99 (2007).
65 Sec, e.g.. Chang, supra note 38, at 295-302.
66. THE DID AR,HION Or' INDEPENDE. CL para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
67 jl)ll"i R\\\'IS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971)
68. ld. at 136 - 37: see id. at 141 ("If a knowledge of particulars is ailmved, then the
outcome is biased by arbitrary cOJ1lingcncics. ").
69. IcE. at HI.
70 let at 4.
7J. lc/ at -1-57.
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This assumption, however, raises the question of whether a world in
which nations engage in international trade in goods, services, capital, and
labor is a "cooperative venture for mutual advantage."72 In light of this
international cooperation, Charles Beitz and others have argued that the
entire world is a "society" in which all individuals would be parties to the
original position. 73 Beitz suggests that "we should not view national
boundaries as having fundamental moral significance" and that "principles
of justice" should "therefore apply globally."74
Furthermore, place of birth would appear to be a circumstance that
Rawls should deem "arbitrary from a moral point of vie\v. "75 Pogge notes
that nationality based on such a circumstance "is just one further deep
contingency (like genetic endowment, race, gender, and social class), one
more potential basis of institutional inequalities that are present from
birth."76 "Within Rawls's conception," Pogge suggests, "there is no reason
to treat this case differently from the others."77 Thus, Pogge also argues in
favor of globalizing Rawls's principles of justice.78
72. 1d at -+
73. See CHARU~ R. BII[!.. POllTIC\1 THLORY AND 1NTERNATIO"',\1 Rrl,\TIO"'~ 143~53
(1979) (arguing that suffiClcnt cooperation and interdependence exists among nations
to justify a global vicw of the original position); sec also THOMAS Pl)CCI. Rr,\IIZINC R,\WI"
257 (1989) (noting that "it \,vould seem difficult in a context of tight global interdepen-
dence to maintain the sharp distinction between national and intc~l1ational institutions"
adoptcd by Rawls); Thomas tv1. Scanlon, Jr., Rawls' Theory oj justicc, 121 U ['A. L. REV.
1020. 1066-67 (1973) (arguing that "considerations of justice apply at least wherever
therc is systematic cconoinic interaction" and that therefore Rawls's prinCiples of justice
"apply to the world economic system taken as a whole").
74. BEITZ, supra note 73. at ] 5]. Others have argued that "thc salience of global
Justice is increasing in the density of interactions across borders" A-J- Julius, Nagel's
Alias. 34 PHil &: PI :1'. AlT. ] 76, ] 87 (2006); sec. e.g., Joshua Cohen &: Charles Sabel.
Extra ReJ11publiwm Nul/a justitia!, 34 PHIL. &: PUI3. All'. ] 47, 164-75 (2006) (arguing
that obligations of global justice have increased with greater international cooperation
anc! interdependence); Julius, supm, at 178 (arguing that "members 01 different stales
arc in the justice relation if their interaction links them densely enough "). for a critique
of any theory of justice that makes obligations of distributive justice' contingent on vol-
ll11tary acts of cooperation. see Howard F. Chang, The ImmigratlO/1 PU/(1(!ox: Poverty,
Distributive justice, and Libclill r.galilarianislll, 52 DEPAUl. L RI'\ 759, 769-7] (2003).
75. RJ\\\IS, supra note 67, at 72.
76. Pl)CCI, supru note 73. at 247
77. Id Similarly, Peter Singer argues that Rawls's stated goal uf a theory o[justice in
which'n,l one is ad\'antaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles hy the out-
come of natural chance or the contingency 01 social circumstances" and a theory that is
"i!](Ii.l!ci"CI1I to Ihe consequences of slllllething as contingent as \\'hich side of a national
border one happens to lIvc" Simply "cannot be reconciled. PI'T[" SI"'CJR. 0"1 \\'<WU)
177 (2002)
78, Sec 1\ )(,CI-:. supm note 73, at 240-80; sec ulso :V1.\RTH,\ C Nl'-,'Jj,\I\1. FR( )!'nIIR~ ()l
J~'-I it I' j)''-\IJIIITY, N,\ II",,-'II]Y, SP!t II, MI\H\lI,~Hl:' 264 (2006) (agtTclIlg that it is "Iar
mOlc appeailJl?'-' for us "10 Ihink of thc Original PosItion as applied directly to the world
:.-l~ a wholc" hecause "national orig:n is rathcr like class background. parenlal wealth,
Ian'. ~\l1d sex: name!y. a ClllltlllgCllt Ltci about a pCTsnn that should not he permittce! In
deform a pnSI)]1's Ide"). Fullowing ill this tradition. 1 have argucd cbc\\hcre 111 favor of
a cOSllwrolltan intcrrrClalion of the "original position " SCI', '-g., Chang. 'iupm note 74,
al 768 73
1-1- CO/Ilell Illll'l!Jeitio!Ju! LUI-v jow!I(d
Citing BeilZ and others, Joseph Carens addresses lhe issue of immigra-
lion restrictions as a question of social justice using a global interpretation
of Rav.rls's original position.?9 In seeking a justification for the exclusion
of aliens, he suggests, "we don't \vant to be biased by set f-interested or par-
tisan considerations" and instead "can take it as a basic presupposition
that we should treat all human beings, not just members of our own soci-
ety, as free and equal moral persons."80 Carens identifies this premise as a
basic feature of all liberal political theories,8J concluding that we should
"take a global, not a national vie\v of the original position."Kl
If we begin with equal concern for all persons, then immigration barri-
ers are morally suspect and demand justification. All immigration restric-
tions discriminate against individuals based on their alienage. Most aliens
are born aliens because our nationality laws deem them to be aliens based
on immutable characteristics, including the geographic location of their
birth (that is, national origin) and the citizenship of their parents at the
time of their birth. 8 ) This discrimination based explicitly on circum-
stances of birth is at odds with liberal ideals. Carens concludes that we
cannot justify restrictions "on the grounds that those born in a given terri-
tory or born of parents who were citizens were more entitled to the benefits
of citizenship than those born elsewhere or of alien parents."84 Similarly,
in a utilitarian calculation of global welfare, "current citizens would enjoy
no privileged position."S5 Carens concludes from these liberal premises
that "we have an obligation to open our borders much more fully than we
do now. "Kb Carens condemns our immigration restrictions: "Like feudal
barriers to mobility, they protect unjust privilege."s7 How might a liberal
79. Sec Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: TIle Case for Opell Bordas, 49 RE\·. POL.
251, 2'55, 272 n8 (1987) (citing BUTZ, supra note 73; Scanlon, supra note 73; and
others).
80. ld. at 256
81. Sec icl at 265 (claiming that "our social institutions and public policies must
respect all human beings as moral persons," \vhich "entails recognition. . of the free-
dom and equalily of every human being"); sec also id at 269 ("No moral argument will
seem acceptable. if it directly challenges the assumption of the equal moral worth of
all individuals"). This liberal commitment to moral equality in the public sphere does
not imply that individuals are wrong to favor their friends or families using their own
private resources Kwame Anthony Appiah argues that equality "denotes a regulative
ideal for political, not personal, conduct." K\\'A~H: ANTHUNY API>I!\H, TilE ETHICS elf' lLJI'N-
TITY 230 (200S).·Social justice may require impartiality - or evenhandedness, or fair-
ness, or 'neutrality,''' he explains, "[b]ut social justice is not an attribute of
individuals" ld. at 228 Although the state may be "bound by moral equality," it would
be "wrong. . to suppose that illdividuals should be subject to the same constraint" ld.
S2. lei at 256
83 Sec US C()",",T. amend. XIV, § 1 CAll persons horn ... in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States "); 8 USc.
§ 1401 (2000) (selting forth categories of "citizens of the United States at birth").
84 Carens, supra note 79, at 261
85. ld. at 263 ("[T]he utilitarian commitment to moral equality is reflected in the
assumption that everyone is to count for one and no one for more than one when utility
is calculated. ").
86. ld. at 270.
87. ld. Others have reached similar conclusions regarding immigration restrictions
in liberal political theory. See, e.g., BRucr A. ACJ<ER~IAN, Sue!.\!. JUSTICE IN nil' LIBERAL
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nevertheless reject the extension of our principles of distributive justice to
prospective immigrants)
A. State Coercion
Although Michael Blake concedes that liberalism is "committed to
moral equality, so that the simple fact of humanity is sufficient to motivate
a demand for equal concern and respecr,"HH he defends "distinct principles
of distributive justice applicable only within the national context."sCJ 1n
particular, he argues that "a concern for specifically economic egalitarian-
ism is only morally required within the context of a domestic legal sys-
tem,"90 where "distinct burdens of justification" apply "between
individuals who share liability to the coercive po\ver of the state."9] He
claims that it is only in the "search for the justification of state coercion"
that "egalitarian distributive justice becomes relevant."CJ}
Although Blake seeks to use state coercion to distinguish the domestic
context from the international context, his suggestion that \ve focus on
state coercion does not distinguish prospective immigrants from incum-
bent residents. After all, we exclude prospective immigrants through the
use or threat of force applied by the stateY3 1n this sense, all aliens are
subject to exclusion under the immigration laws enforced by our state, and
they may demand that we justify this coercive exclusion \vithin a frame-
work of equal concern and respect for al1. 9-1
Blake recognizes this problem but asserts thal "each distinct form of
coercion requires a distinct form of justification."CJ,) Without elaborating,
STAT[' 93 (1980) ("'I cannOl justify my power to exclude you without destroying my own
claim to membership in an ideal liberal state"); PHII.LlP COI.E, PI Ill' bOPHlrs or EXCLII.
SIOI': LJI:lI~\1. POLlTlC,\1. THLlWY ,\:"D [MMIGR,-\TION 202 (2000) (concluding thal "liberal
theory cannot provide a .Iuslirication ror membership control and remain a coherent
political philosophy"'); Peter H Schuck, The Transformation of Jnlllligration Law, 84
COl.lM L RIO\'. 1,85 (J 984) (noting that "in a truly liberal polity. it would be difficult to
justify a restrictive immigration law or perhaps any immigration law at aJr').
88. '1ichael Blake, DisllibLilivejusticf, State Coercion, and AlIto/](J/l]Y. 30 PHIL. & PUB.
AFr 257, 257 (2002)
89. Jd. at 258
90. Id. at 265.
9J. Jd. at 26+
92. ld. at 265.
93. Sec C(ll F, SlIpro nOle H7, at 186 ("\Vhat is. . crucial here is 10 realise that there
are t\\O groups subjected to the laws of the state' its own members, and those non-
members who are applying fOI- inclusion.").
94. S,.c Carens, SlIP/U IWIC 79, at 256 (arguing that "anyonc who wants to be moral
will feel obliged to justify the usc or force against other human beings, whether they arc
members of the same societ)" or not" and that "'"ve can take it as a basic presupposition
that we should treat all human beings, not just members of our own society as free and
equal moral persons"): Julius. SlIpru notc 7-+, at lRR (suggesting tlul "you shouldn't use
other people by directing illl'ir action [0 your benefit unless you can show that the result-
ing sequence of actions and results is sl)mcthing they themselvcs h~l\'c reason to want tl)
COI11C about,-' which demand" '"an ('ljual considcratil1n or l)\her people's interests"): id. at
IHI (""Ill impose terms ()n VOLI. I alll required to make them acceptable to Vl1U. I trigger
this rCljuirement just by intcnding 10 coerce you')
05 I)lake. supra nl1le RR. at 280 n30
i6 (ollll'li !1/!Cill(//it)!Wi Lmv jOllillul
he ciairns that the justification that \vt' owe to a prospective immigrant
'\vnulcl he- Significantly different from that offered LO a present m.ember for
the web or legal coercion within which she currently lives" ~\nd that only
inequality among "current" members of our society "gives rise to a legiti·
mate concern for relative deprivation."L)(, This limit on the justification
o\-ved to the prospective immigrant seems at oelds with Blake's broad claim
that "Rawls's ... theory of justice might profitably be vie\·ved as a theory by
which the coercive force of the state might be justified to free and equal
persons who have a prima facie morai entitlement to be free from all coer-
cion."l)7 Blake does not qualify this claim based on the nature or the scope
of the coercion to be justified. As Seyla Benhabib observes:
[A]s a moral being you have a lundamental right to justification. Your
freedom can be restricted only through reciprocally and generally justifiable
norms 'which equally apply to all. In the sphere of morality, generality
means universality; universality refers to v"hat would be v<J,lid for all human
beings considered as being equally entitled to respect and concern. 98
Blake's treatment of immigration begs the question: vVhy should the pro-
spective immigrant accept a justification for our immigration laws that
does not offer the alien the equal concern embodied in the Rawlsian origi-
nal position, including a concern for relative deprivation?
It is unclear why \-ve should limit our concern for relative deprivation
to those currently living within our ·'\.veb of legal coercion." If the claim is
that prospective immigrants are burdened in only a minor way by our
immigration laws, which therefore require little justification, then this
empirical claim is questionable, given the significant harm suffered by
those excluded from our labor market. Although prospective immi.grants
do not currently live under all of our laws, this fact does not diminish the
coercion that they suffer and the costs that they bear under our immigra-
tion laws. This fact may change the law in question that requires justifica-
tion, but it should not change what counts as a justification. That is, a
defense of our immi.gration laws must give the aliens coerced by our state
the same equal concern extended to citizens coerced by our state, includ-
ing a concern for relative deprivation.
Even if we grant Blake's claim that one must live within our web of
coercive laws to be entitled to a concern for relative deprivation, we must
extend such concern to the unauthorized immigrant who also lives within
this web. For example, if we seek to deport the unauthorized immigrant as
a means of enforCing our immigration laws, then the immigrant may
demand that we justify those laws in terms that reflect concern for the
relative deprivation that we impose through those laws. This right to dis-
tributive justice may well block deportation in the case of an immigrant
who would be excludable at the border in the absence of such a right. Yet it
96. Id.
97. Id. at 271 (emphasis added).
98. SEYI.A BENH'\BIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDE 'T5, i\t';D CITlZE 5 133
(2004).
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seems perverse and unfair to give the unauthorized immigrant a right to
distributive justice that ,ve do not extend to the prospective immigrant who
obediently complies ""vith our immigration laws. Such a stance invites pro-
spective immigrants to enter illegally so that they may obtain this right. Yet
if we cite the unauthorized immigrant's violation of our immigration laws
as the reason to deny that immigrant a right to distributive justice, then
how are \ve to respond to that immigrant's demand that we justify those
immigration laws first? After all, we owe even criminals a justification for
the la\vs we invoke to punish them, and Blake agrees that "a concern for
relative deprivation" is relevant in such a demand for justification9Y
B. Collective Self-Governance
If we deny the unauthorized immigrant a right to distributive justice,
then we must be requiring something more than simply living under our
web of coercive laws to generate such a right. One response to this prob-
lem might be to distinguish both prospective and unauthorized immigrants
from citizens by pointing to some other feature of citizens. Thomas NageL
for example, suggests that "the objection to arbitrary inequalities" arises
only among "fellow participants in a collective enterprise of coercively
imposed legal and political institutions that generates such arbitrary ine-
qualities."lOO He claims that "[i]t is only from such a system, and from our
fellow members through its institutions, that we can claim a right to
democracy, equal citizenship, nondiscrimination, equality of opportunity,
and the amelioration through public policy of unfairness in the distribu-
tion of social and economic goodS."IOI Similarly, Stephen Macedo asserts
that we should confine "the extensive obligation of distributive justice to
self-governing and self-responsible political communities: peoples \vho
share a common political life and who exercise extensive authority over
one another." I02
Like Blake, Nagel notes that a regime's "requirements claim our active
cooperation, and this cannot be legitimately done without justification."] 03
By participation in such a collective enterprise, however, Nagel means
more than mere cooperation through obedience. The law-abiding prospec-
tive immigrant, after all, cooperates with us by complying with our immi-
gration laws. Nagel stresses that "we are both putative joint authors of the
coercively imposed system, and subject to its norms, ie., expected to accept
their authority."104 Prospective and unauthorized immigrants are not
putative joint authors of our immigration laws. Furthermore, Nagel
claims, "the laws are not imposed in their name, nor are they asked to
99. Blake, supra nOle 88, al 276.
100. Thomas'l 'agel, TIlt' Problem oj Global Justice', 33 PHil. &: PlB. ;"n 113 128
(2005).
101 Id. al 127
]02. Slephen Macedo, 'What Sd(.Govcrning Pf(lpb Owe 10 One Another: L'niwTsalislll,
Diversity and The Law of Peoples, 72 F,iIW1J.A\! L Rn·. \ 72], 1731 (200..t)
[03. Nagel, supra nole 100 at ] 29.
104 Id at 128
It: C(I/!lC!i IIlIC!I!LUlullul l.mv JOUI/IlI!
accept and uphold those laws"! (I',
It is ohscure, however, in what sense prospectivE' immigrants are not
'asked to accept and uphold thust' Ln,vs," given that \ve threaten criminal
penalties for aliens who enter illegally, il)() Nagel's claim would come as a
surprise to the unauthorized immigrant sentenced [0 imprisonment for vio-
!cHing our immigration laws, If \-\le do not ask immigrants [0 "accept and
uphold" these laws, then why do we punish violators! It is difficult to per-
ceive any respect in \vhich V\ie do not ask aliens to "accept and uphold" our
immigration policies, given the way that we treat violators under our laws
and in our public discourse, 'vvhich seems to regard unauthorized immi-
grants simply as lawbreakers deserving of punishment.
furthermore, Nagel's observation that our immigration laws "are not
imposed in their name" 107 merely begs the question of whether we should
impose immigration laws that we can justify in the name of all those
affected, His observation provides no persuasive defense for immigration
laws that are too restrictive to be justified in such terms, If Nagel intends
to cite our failure to give equal consideration to the interests of prospective
immigrants as a justification for immigration laws that fail to give their
interests equal consideration,lOH then his reasoning would seem to prove
too much,
Consider a society that permits slavery, Suppose it seeks to defend its
lav\is by noting that the slaves do not participate in that society's collective
enterprise of self-governance and are thus not "putative joint authors of the
coercively imposed system," adding that "the laws are not imposed in their
name," 109 This proposed justification would not be persuasive, precisely
because the very fact that the laws exclude the slaves from participation
and are not imposed in their name is a reason to deem the laws unjust. 110
Therefore, a person's participation in the collective enterprise of self-gov-
ernance as a "putative joint author[ 1 of the coercively imposed system"ll I
105. lei. at 130
106, Any alien guilty of improper entry may be imprisoned for up to six months "for
the first commission of any such offense" and for up to two years "for a subsequent
commission of any such offense," 8 USC § 1325 (2000), Furthermore, any alien pre-
viously ordered removed who thereafter "enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time
found in ... the United States" may be imprisoned for up to two years and under certain
specified conditions may be imprisoned for up to 20 years, lcl, § 1326, Criminal prose-
cutions of such aliens under these provisions have increased dramatically in recent
years. Sec Kevin R,Johnson, Opcn Borders?, 51 UCLA L REV, 193,248 (2003);James C
McKinley,Jr, Tuuglla Tactics Deter Migrants at US Border, .Y TI~II'S, reb, 21, 2007, at
;\ Il)
107 Nagel, supra note 100, at 130.
108, Scc iel. at 129-30,
109 Scc id, at 128, no,
I to As AJ Julius observes, "[T)here is no obvious respect in which the laws of the
antebellum Uniled Slates can be said to have been enacted in the name of the slaves. ,-
Julius, supra note 74, at 183, In a regime of"nahcd tyranny," as Julius notes, "[pJeople do
what the tyrant tells them to do so that he will not kill them," and the problem Wilh
agel's theory is that Nagel "cannot find injustice in their situation," yet "it is hard to
agree that the society is not unjust." lel,
111 Nagel, supra note 100, at 128.
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cannot be a necessary condition for that person's right to distributive jus-
tice in that system. If we reject the proposed defense of slavery on the
ground that the exclusion of slaves from political participation and from
the sphere of equal concern is unjust and a violation of human rights, then
we beg the question: Are restrictive immigration laws also unjust because
they exclude both prospective and unauthorized immigrants from full par-
ticipation in our society? L12 Before we cite participation in self-governance
as a basis for the right to distributive justice, we must first demonstrate
that the restrictions we impose on this participation, including immigra-
tion restrictions, are themselves justified. The implicit assumption is that
we are justified in discounting the wei fare of prospective immigrants when
we formulate our immigration laws. This proposed justification for our
immigration laws 'would suffer from circular reasoning if it ultimately
relies on an assumption that these la\vs are just.
C. Involuntary Residence
\lve might distinguish immigrants from natives on the ground that
immigrants seek to associate with us voluntarily whereas natives are born
into our society and have no choice. Nagel, for example, stresses "the con-
tingency of involuntary rather than voluntary association," claiming that
"[a]n institution that one has no choice about joining must offer terms of
membership that meet a higher standard" than voluntary associations] 13
Similarly, Joseph Heath notes that "being born into society is a circum-
sta.nce, \vhile moving into one is a cllOice,"114 arguing that "involuntarily
incurred obligations must meet a much higher standard in order to be con-
sidered binding."! I 5 In particular, Heath claims that "[t]he conditions
under which immigrants secure admittance. . are not involuntary," and,
therefore, "the strict criterion of equality ... need not apply."116 This dis-
tinction would al1mv us to justify not only laws discriminating against
unauthorized or prospective immigrants but also nativist laws that fail to
extend equal concern to Iega. I immigrants after admission.
This suggestion seems to turn liberalism on its head insofar as it enti-
tles natives in rich countries to advantages based on immutable circum-
stances of birth. Nagel concedes that "[w]e do not deserve to have been
born into a particular society any more than we deserve to have been born
into a particular family," yet he maintains that only natives enjoy a pre-
sumption against arbitrary inequality, "so an arbitrary distinction is
112. .As Pogge recalls: "1 lIven 1he injustices we now recognize as 1he most conspicu-
ous (slavery and the inferior status of women) were once entirely taken for granted
Those advantaged by them found it easy not to lhink about lhem or, at best, to invoke
some shallow rationalizations. . ." PU(;<.I:, SlIJ!W nOle 73. at 278. He asks: "Are we
today any more immune to comfortable errors of moral Judgment)"' fd.
I] 3. ·agel. SlIJ!/(l note 100, at 133.
114 jnscph Ikath, flJJlJli!swtioll, Multiculturalism. (//1(1 the Social C()lJt/(llt. III C\:"JL
& Jl:RISI'IU:I)):"U 343 .. 350 (1997)
I 15 Iii at 351
i 16. Iii al 3'5'5
COl nell I il Ie 11](/ I jOIJ(/ I C(/ IV to tI uw I
respollsibie for the scope of the presumption against arbitrariness" 117
This suggestion seems to fly in the face of reality when those born in rich
countries cite the circumstances of their birth as if it were some son of
cllsadvant age justifying privileges not extended to those born in poor coun-
tries 'vvhu seek to move "voluntarily" into those rich countries. After all,
those born into poor countries involuntarily incur poverty and the legal
obligation to comply 'vvith the immigration laws of rich countries. Given
those realities, why not impose the same standard of distributive justice to
bind prospective immigrants under our immigration laws as 'vve apply to
natives under other laws? A view more sensitive to social, legal, and eco-
nomic realities would recognize the claims of prospective immigrants based
on all the burdens that they have involuntarily incurred.
Nagel and Heath assume that natives are not free to emigrate and
therefore reside involuntarily in their country of origin. They may base
their assumption on a realistic evaluation of the feasibility of emigration
under current conditions. Insofar as they base this assumption on the
immigration barriers raised by other countries, however, they make our
right to distributive justice curiously contingent on the immigration poli-
cies of other countries. 118 If another country opens its borders to some,
most, or all prospective migrants from our country, do those who are free
to emigrate become voluntary residents who are therefore not entitled to
distributive justice? II 9
Nagel and Heath may invoke not only legal barriers to migration but
also those barriers raised in practice by the social or economic costs of
migration for the individual migrant. Heath, for example, suggests that
"the costs associated with emigration are so high that nationality is de facto
involuntary," conceding that "the distinction between voluntary and invol-
untary is determined by some notion of which options an individual could
reasonably be expected to exercise." 120 Often, however, these costs are
quite low, as when a native of the United States contemplates migration to
Canada, or when a native of Australia contemplates migration to New Zea-
land. If such emigration is quite easy for the native, then does this option
undermine that native's claim to distributive justice? Furthermore, once
we recognize that the difference between "involuntary" residence and "vol-
untary" migration is not only a matter of degree, but also a question of
what options we should deem "reasonable," then the claims advanced by
117. Nagel, supra note 100, at 128.
118. If Nagel and Heath base this assumption on barriers to immigration raised by
other countries, then their claims beg the question of whether both natives and the for-
eign-born should ideally enjoy greater freedom of movement across borders. See, e.g.,
Seyla Benhabib, The Law of Peoples, Distributive Justice, and Migrations, 72 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1761, 1774 (2004) (suggesting that "liberal peoples ought to have fairly open bor-
ders," permitting both "a fundamental right to emigrate" and "the privilege to immigrate,
that is, to enter another peoples' territory and become a member of its society
peacefully") .
119. Some neighboring countries do in fact allow for "relatively easy migration" on a
regional basis. Johnson, supra note 106, at 240 -41; see, e.g., Larry Rohter, South Ameri-
can Trading Bloc Frees Movement oj Its People, NY Tl1"IES, Nov. 24, 2002, at A6.
120. Heath, supra note 114, at 351 n.25.
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Nagel and Heath beg the question: Should we regard residence in a poor
country to be so costly as to make it unreasonable for us to expect the
prospective migrant to refrain from migration to a rich country7
D. The Absence o[ a Cosmopolitan State
Macedo rejects claims o[ cosmopolitan distributive justice, finding it
"hard to understand the reasonableness of making people responsible for
the weI fare o[ others without also making them responsible for their gov-
ernance." 121 "Cosmopolitan distributive justice," he concludes, "makes no
sense absent a cosmopolitan state. "122 Even if we assume that the absence
of a cosmopolitan state implies some limits on global distributive justice,
however, this absence would not justify immigration restrictions that neg-
lect principles of global distributive justice. After all, the admission of any
given set of immigrants would make us "responsible for their governance"
as well as responsible for their welfare. Upon joining our society, the
immigrant could agree to the same terms of the social contract as the native
born into our society. I 23 Why should our inability to govern immigrants
prior to admission justify our failure to consider their welfare in the admis-
sion decision, as long as we can govern them after admission7
Perhaps the concern is that immigrants may not have paid their fair
share of tax revenues and could thereby unfairly exploit the public treasury
in the country of immigration. Heath, [or example, worries that '"if states
lifted immigration controls in the current global context, they would open
themselves up to a variety of forms of harmful predation."124 "No \veHare
state could survive," he notes, "if people chose to spend their childhood
and retirement in a welfare state, yet their working lives in a lmv-taxation
state with minimal public services." l25 These concerns, however, only jus-
tify poliCY responses tailored to those specific concerns, not general restric-
tions on immigration. We might address such concerns, for example, with
fiscal policies that impose appropriate conditions on immigration. To
ensure that immigrants do not unfairly drain the public treasury, we might
restrict immigrants' access to the particular public entitlements raising
121. Macedo, supra note 102, at 1731.
l22. Id. Rawls adopts a similar vievy' of distributive justice. For Rawls, as Samuel
Freeman explains, "Distributive justice in the first instance poses the general problem of
fairly designing the system of basic legal institutions and social norms," and "in the
absence of a world state, there can be no global basic structure on a par with the basic
structure of societv." SAMuEL FREEMt\N, Jl'STlCE AND THE SOClt\1 CONTR1\CT 305 -06
(2007). These obs~rvations, however, beg the question: \-\lhy should the prinCiples of
distributive justice that we bring to bear on "basic legal institutions" such as immigra-
tion policy fail to extend equal concern to those born outside the country of immigra-
tion) Why nOl adopt a broi\der view of distribmive justice and apply principles of glohal
justice in the normative evaluation of immigration policies)
123. Regarding prospective immigrants outside "the borders of the rich nations" who
are "desperate for the opportunity [0 become pan of those national communities'-' PeLer
Singer observes: "There is no reason to think that, if 'A'e admitted them, they would be
any less rCi\dy than nal1\'e-born citizens to reciprocate whatever benefits lhev receive
from tbe community." SINGFR, supra note 77. at ] 69-70.
124 lkarh, slIpra nOLe 1 14. at 347.
125 id al 348.
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those concerns, for example, or impose special taxes on immigrants as a
form of admission fee in appropriate cases, These policies vvould be less
restrictive than immigration restrictions that exclude prospective immi-
grants from our country entirely and thereby needlessly destroy gains from
trade in the labor market. Il6More important, any such concern would
seem to raise questions only regarding the particular policies that could be
justified within a framework of equal concern Fiscal concerns do not pro-
vide much of a reason to question the basic premise that any lavv is morally
justified only if its rationale extends equal concern to all those affected,
'vVe might say the same regarding suggestions that liberal immigration
policies would pose various other problems, For example, Heath worries
that liberal immigration could undermine the incentives for "the provision
of public goods for future generations, by such measures as encouraging a
high rate of savings, controlling public debt, preventing long-term environ-
mental degradation, [and] implementing population control measures." 127
Rawls expresses similar concerns, worrying that people may be tempted to
"make up for their irresponsibility in caring for their land and its natural
resources ... by migrating into other people's territory."llR If Heath and
Rawls are worried about the incentives to invest in local public goods in
countries of emigration, then two considerations suggest that their con-
cerns provide little support for immigration restrictions.
First, we should recognize that it is entirely appropriate for a country
of emigration to take future emigration into account in deciding how much
to invest in local public goods. Insofar as emigration implies a smaller
126. Sec Chandran Kukanthas, The Case Jar Open Immigration, ill C()~THvl[,URr\RY
DUIMES IN ApPLIED ETHICS 208, 213 (Andrew I. Cohen &- Christopher Heath 'vVellman
eds, 2005) (noting that "[i]f the concern is to preserve the integrity of the welfare state,
. the most that could be justified is restricting membership of the welfare system,"
which "would be better than no opportunity to move at all").
127. Heath, supra note 114, at 348. Heath worries, for example, that "if China could
count on an ability to export its surplus population to less crowded parts of the world,
the incentive to control it would be considerablv diminished" [d.; sec also David Miller,
Immigration: The Case Jar Limits, in CO~TI""II'l)R;\RY DEll/\TES IN ApPLIED ETHICS, supra note
126, at 193, 201 ("A viable population policy ... requires each state to be responSible
for stabilizing ... its population over time, and this is going to be impossible, .. if there
are no restrictions on the movement of people between states."). We should weigh such
claims against the empirical evidence indicating that migration "may accelerate the
slowing of population growth," because "[mjigrants who move from high-fertility to low-
fertility regions or their descendants often adopt the reduced-fertility patterns of their
new home, with some time delay." Joel E. Cohen, Human Population Grows Up, SCI. A 'I.,
Sept. 2005, at 48, 54; see Francine D. Slau, TIle Fertility oj [nlmigrant Womell Evidence
from High-Fertility So~!rce Countries, ill LvIMIGRATION ;\ND TilE WORK fewer 93, 127
(George j. Borjas &- Richard 8. Freeman eds, (992) (reporting "indirect evidence sug-
gesting that immigrant women have fevv'er children in the United States than they would
have had in the source country"); Eric Neumayer, The Environment: Olle More Rmsoll to
Keep Immigrants Out?, 59 Ecul.oGIC/\! ECON 204, 206 (2006) ("[I]f forced to remain in
their developing sending country, ... \-vould-be emigrants are likely to have more chil-
dren than they will in their chosen country of destination"). furthermore, as "remit-
tance payments are likely to spur economic development" and "more developed
countries have lower fertility rates," emigration would be "likely" to "have a negative
rather than positive effect on birth rates in receiving countries" JeI.
128. JOlif'i Rr"'\-VLS, THE LAW or PLlWLlS 39 (1999).
2008 The Economics oj International Labor Migration 23
population in the future than would otherwise exist, the benefits derived
from a local public good will be smaller, and a reduced investment in such
a good would be socially optimal. A legitimate concern arises only if the
prospect of future emigration leads some residents in the country of emi-
gration to withdraw support for even this optimal level of investment
because they anticipate their own future emigration.
Second, even if the prospect of emigration distorts investment belmv
the optimal level, there are probably bener policy responses available to the
country of immigration than immigralion restrictions. If the country of
immigration is actually concerned about local public goods in countries of
emigration, then the country of immigration can always use its jurisdiction
over immigrants to collect tax revenue from them to finance subsidies for
investments in public goods in countries of emigration. Such subsidies
would be better than the exclusion of prospective immigrants insofar as a
policy of exclusion needlessly destroys gains from trade in the labor
market.
Heath may also be worried about incentives to invest in public goods
in the country of immigration. I 29 lmmigrants may congest local public
goods and thereby reduce the return that natives enjoy on their investment
in these public goods. 130 Again, we would have these concerns even
within a framework of distributive justice for all and could address these
concerns through measures more nano",'ly tailored than general immigra-
tion restrictions. We could, for example, charge immigrants an appropriate
fee for access to any public good subjeci 10 congestion without imposing
other immigration restrictions. Such fees can internalize negative external-
ities from immigration, deter inefficienl immigration, and compensate
natives for any congestion of local public goods arising from immigra-
tion. I., I '0/e can \veigh all of these concerns against the claims of the immi-
grant in deciding what policy responses are appropriate.
After all, similar concerns also arise within a society in the absence of
any immigration. We may worry thai redistribution from the rich to the
poor, for example, undermines the incentives of poor families to save or to
have fewer children. J 32 I do not deny that similar concerns may arise with
liberal immigration policies. My only claim is that our policy response to
these concerns in the immigration context should extend equal concern
and respect to all those affected, just as our policy response to similar con-
cerns in the domestic context should be based on equal concern and
129. See Heath, Sllpro no[e 114, at 3-+7.
130. Sec Miller, supra note] 27, at 202 (worrying aboUl immigration's "impacts on the
physical en\'ironment." such as "congest ion" and red llced "access to open space"),
131 M
132 Peter Singer criticize" "Rawls's readiness t,) invoke, against the Ide;\ of eCl1I1omic
redistribution between nations, arguments that could easily be brought, .. against cco-
nl)J1!}C redistrihutinn bct\\eell individuals or families wilhlll the same nation." SI0.l,IR,
SlipW nOll' 77, ;l\ 178, "Both cases raise a prohlem for anyone who SUPPPr1S thc redistri-
bution or \\'eahh. and if the prohlem can he ans\\CTcd in the case or redistrihution \\'ilhin
a socie[y." as Singer n,)tes, there would appear 10 he "no reason \\'h; it cannot be
ilns\\'l'rl'd in the case nf rcdistrihutinn betwccn "pcietics" ld
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respect. If we understand in the domestic context that it is unfair for a
native born into a large and poor family to suffer as a result of circum-
stances beyond his or her control, for example, then we should also under-
stand in the immigration context that it is unfair for an alien born into a
poor and populous country to suffer as a resLdt of similar circum-
stances. 1 D I have suggested that the attempts by some liberal theorists
and philosophers to distinguish immigration policies from laws in the
domestic context in this regard are all ultimately question-begging.
Conclusion
As Philippe Legrain observes, advances in transportation and telecom-
munication technology, together with the "individualism" fostered by the
spread of liberal ideals, have allowed us to "roam our newly open world
more freely than before" and have "undermined the tyranny of geography
which tied people to a place and loosened the shackles of nationalism
which dictated that people in one place should all be alike." I:H In this
globalizing world, he suggests, "[01ur efforts to keep poor people out" of
rich countries "are a form of global apartheid," and "if our conscience is
not sufficient to persuade us to change course, then our sel f-interest surely
ought to." \35 I have argued that a survey of the evidence on the economic
effects of migration supports these normative claims.
Estimates of the magnitude of the gains that the nations of the world
could enjoy by liberalizing international migration indicate that even par-
tial liberalization would not only produce substantial increases in the
world's real income but also improve its distribution. Although the eco-
nomic effects of immigration on native workers and distributive justice
among natives are often advanced as reasons to reduce immigration, these
concerns do not provide a sound justification for our restrictive immigra-
tion laws. Instead, the appropriate response to concerns about the distri-
bution of income among natives is to increase the progressivity of our tax
system. Protectionist immigration policies are not only likely to be rela-
tively costly as an instrument for redistribution but also perverse from the
standpoint of global justice.
133. See Kok-Chor Tan, Critical Notice, 31 CA . J PHIL. 133, 122 (2001) (reviewing
Rr\\V15, supra notc 128) (noting that "[oJI1 Rawls's own reasoning, a person born into a
society with poor population control and economic policies cannot be said to deserve
her fate any more than another born into more favorable circumstances," because
"[t1hese are mere accidents of birth, and are as morally arbitrary as is being born into
wealth or poverty in the domestic context"). Natives of rich countries may claim that it
is unfair to saddle them with the claims of poor immigrants because conditions in poor
coumries are largely outside of the comral of the natives of rich countries. This claim,
however, reflects an incongruous nOlion of fairness. This notion is sensitive to the bur-
dens imposed on natives of rich coumries for reasons outside their control, yet simulta-
neously insensitive to the burdens imposed on those born in poor countries, despite the
fact that their circumstances of birth are entirely outside their control.
134. PHILIPPE LtGRi\\ " IMMIGRr\NTS: YOUR Cl)UNTRY feEDS THEI'vI 323-24 (2006).
135. ld. at 324.
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I have suggested that liberal ideals require a global viev\' of distributive
justice, and I have outlined critiques of some of the alternative conceptions
of justice advanced by critics of this cosmopolitan perspective. I conclude
that considerations of not only economic efficiency but also distributive
justice militate in favor of liberalized migration. Considerations of distrib-
utive justice suggest that liberal states should seek to liberalize their immi-
gration policies, thereby reducing global inequalities in economic
opportunity.136 It is incumbent upon liberal states to pursue such liberal-
izing reforms if they are to remain faithful to the egalitarian ideals that they
espouse.
136. The immigration bill debated by the Senate in 2006 would have liberalized the
ceiling on the number of guest-worker visas annually in response to excess demand for
those visas. See Senate Rest/mes Comprehensive Immigration Reform Debate, 83 INTI'R·
J>RETER RELEASES 981 (2006). Berore passing that bill, however, the Senate amended the
bill to fix that ceiling at 200,000 visas per year Id.
